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Piroozi v. Eighth Jud. Dict. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Dec. 31, 2015)1
TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPARATIVE FAULT
Summary
Real parties in interest, Hurst and Abbington sought and obtained a pretrial order from
the district court barring petitioners, Dr. Piroozi and Dr. Blahnik, from arguing comparative fault
of settled defendants at trial and including those defendants’ names on the verdict forms. In
granting the Writ of Mandamus filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court of Nevada resolved a
conflict between NRS 41.141(3)2 and NRS 41A.0453, holding that NRS 41A.0454 preempts NRS
41.141(3)5 and entitles a defendant to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants at trial
and to include the settled defendant’s names on the jury verdict form.
Background
Hurst and Abbington, jointly and on behalf of their daughter, filed a complaint against
several medical providers alleging professional negligence. All defendants settled except for the
petitioners. Prior to trial, Hurst and Abbington filed a motion to bar petitioners from arguing
comparative fault of the settled defendants at trial and including those defendant’s names on the
verdict forms. The district court, relying on NRS 41.1416 (the comparative negligence statute
governing liability of multiple defendants) granted the motion. Petitioners sought a writ of
mandamus ordering the district court to allow petitioners to argue the comparative fault of the
settled defendants and to place those names on the verdict forms.
Discussion
Consideration of the writ petition
The Court considered the writ on the basis that the case involved important legal issues
that required clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration.7 The Court
determined consideration of the petition would promote judicial economy and administration in
not only this case, but similar pending negligence cases because the resolution of the issues in
this case will promote settlements and reduce the time and expense of future trials.
Merits of the writ petition
Petitioners contended the district court abused its discretion in relying upon NRS
41.141(3) 8 , which prohibits a jury from considering the comparative negligence of settled
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defendants and settlement amounts, when a remaining defendant asserts a comparative
negligence defense. Petitioners argued that NRS 41.141(3) 9 does not apply to professional
negligence actions against healthcare providers because its application invalidates NRS
41A.045’s10 abrogation of joint and several liability by preventing petitioners from arguing the
liability of settled defendants.
The Court explained the plain language of NRS 41A.04511 unequivocally provides that
defendants in professional negligence actions are severally liable for damages. Thus, an injured
plaintiff in a healthcare provider professional negligence action can only recover the defendant’s
share of the injured plaintiff’s damages. The plain language of NRS 41A.04512 and the statutes
corresponding ballot initiative explanation demonstrate the purpose of the statute was to protect
individual defendants from liability exceeding the defendant’s fault.
In addressing the conflict between the two statutes when read together, the Court held
that if defendants can be held responsible for only their share of an injured plaintiff’s damages, it
follows that defendants must be allowed to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants
and the jury verdict forms must account for the settled defendant’s percentage of fault.
Moreover, NRS 41A.04513 is a special statute focusing specifically on professional negligence of
medical providers. Where a general and a special statute, each relating to the same subject are in
conflict and cannot be read together, the special statute controls.14 Thus, in this context, NRS
41A.04515 displaces NRS 41.14116 and the district court was required to permit petitioners the
opportunity to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants.
Conclusion
The writ petition was granted because the plain language of NRS 41A.04517 intended that
defendants in a medical provider negligence action be held responsible only for their share of a
plaintiff’s damages. Because the case involved medical provider negligence, NRS 41.141 18 is
displaced by NRS 41A.04519 as it is a special statute. It thus follows that defendants must be
allowed to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and the jury verdict forms must
account for the settled defendant’s percentage of fault.
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Dissent
The dissent concludes that NRS 41A.045 20 is ambiguous and does not abrogate NRS
17.245’s21 offset provision, making it improper to introduce evidence of settlement.22
Ambiguity
The dissent argued NRS 41A.04523 is ambiguous: 1) The words “each defendant” could
be read to either limit several liability to actions with multiple defendants or permit several
liability, even when there is only one defendant; and 2) NRS 41A.04524 is unclear whether the
percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant for which he/she is liable is based only in
relation to other defendants in the action or in relation to all persons at fault, including settled
defendants. In the dissent’s view, because there was ambiguity, legislative history should be
considered.
Single or multiple defendants
The dissent considered the ballot explanation section of NRS 41A.045 25 to determine
voter intent. The dissent argued the explanation section of the ballot questionnaire relevant to
NRS 41A.045 states, “[c]urrent law provides that each one of multiple defendants in medical
malpractice is severally, but not jointly liable.” Thus, the dissent concluded that the voters
intended NRS 41A.045 to only apply to medical malpractice actions with multiple defendants.
Several liability in relation to whom
The dissent contended that requiring multiple defendants for NRS 41A.045 26 to apply
allows the court to resolve the second ambiguity with a canon of statutory interpretation.
Specifically, when a legislature adopts language that has a particular meaning or history, the
rules of statutory construction indicate that a court may presume that the legislature intended a
similar meaning. In applying this canon to the second ambiguity, the dissent contended NRS
41A.045 27 imposes several liability only in relation to remaining defendants, and not settled
defendants.
As to the settled defendants, NRS 41A.04528 must be reconciled with NRS 17.245(1)(a)29
(effects of release or covenant not to sue). The dissent argued that allowing several liability
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between all tortfeasors, including settled defendants, is discordant with NRS 17.245(1)(a), 30
which requires a district court to reduce any judgement by all amounts paid by settled defendants
that were liable in tort for the same injury. Under this theory, if a defendant could argue
comparative negligence as to settled defendants, then she would only be liable for her
proportional fault in relation to them. Because the judgment issued against this defendant would
amount to her exactly liability, she would receive a windfall when NRS 17.245(1)(a) 31 reduced
that judgment by all settlement amounts. Thus, this interpretation should be avoided because it is
in conflict with the function of NRS 17.245(1)(a)32. The dissent concluded that NRS 41A.04533
should be construed to prohibit a defendant from arguing the comparative negligence of settled
defendants and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in its order granting the
pretrial motion.
NRS 17.245
The dissent argued the Court has previously held that in association with NRS
17.245(1)(a)34, parties may not inform the jury as to ether the existence of a settlement or the
sum paid in order to prevent improper speculation by the jury.35 Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by not allowing discussion as to a settlement occurring and the settlement
amount.
Defendant’s names on the jury verdict forms
The dissent argued the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to place
settled defendant’s names on the jury verdict form because that decision was consistent with the
Court’s decision in Moore36, wherein the jury may not be informed of settlement.
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